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The Restatement (Second): Some
Not So Fine Tuning for a Restatement
(Third): A Very Well-Curried Leflar over
Reese with Korn on the Side (Or Is It Cob?)
BRUCE POSNAK*
INTRODUCTION

This Symposium deals with two questions: Is a Restatement (Third) of Conflict of
Laws needed, and if so what should it include? Although reasonable people differ
about whether the time is ripe to actually adopt a new restatement, most agree that we
should at least start talking about it. Although this Article is devoted to the second
question,' in the interest of full disclosure, I should say that I am in the camp of those
who believe that we need a third restatement sooner rather than later. Ideally,
however, the American Law Institute should adopt a model act for choice of law to
replace the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement")
because whatever we come up with will almost certainly not restatethe conflicts law
of any place known to woman. Although this did not deter the drafters of the Second
Restatement,3 to be honest and avoid misleading, our product should not be called a
restatement.
Although the Second Restatement was criticized even while it was in the
Reporter's, Professor Reese's, womb4 (where the gestation period was longer than
that of a herd of elephants, 1953-1971) and continues to be challenged by many
commentators,S if not judges,6 it adopted the correct basic approach. The Second
Restatementcombined rules that do not take the policies of the forum or the content
of the competing laws into account (jurisdiction-selecting rules) with an analysis that

* Professor of Law, Mercer University. B.A., 1963; LL.B., University ofMaryland, 1966.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his research assistant, Brian
Daughdrill.
1. The questions, of course, are intertwined. If one can see a significantly better solution
to choice-of-law problems than the SecondRestatementprovides, one is more likely to answer
the first question in the positive; whereas, if one cannot, then one would be likely to answer
negatively.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].

3. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observationsand an EmpiricalNote, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1237 (1997).
4. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on
Contracts, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw 349, 349-50 (Kurt H.
Hadelman et al. eds., 1961); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last
Appealfor Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1230 (1965); Russell J. Weintraub, The
ContractsProposalsofthe Second Restatement of Conflict ofLaws-A Critique,46 IOWA L.
REV. 713, 713, 718-21 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466, 486-89 (1991); Joseph William Singer, Real
Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1989).
6. See ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws 132 (5th ed. 1993).
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does.7 The combining ofjurisdiction-selecting rules with choice influencing factors
brought together the best of both worlds: the flexibility of an "ad hoc" approach
necessary for desirable results in individual cases, and the certainty, predictability,
ease ofjudicial administration, and uniformity ofresult that rules tend to bring about.'
The SecondRestatement,however, needs some serious adjustments. It should contain
no rigid rules. It should eliminate contact identification and characterization as we
know them. It should contain only two presumption-raising, jurisdiction-selecting
rules. It should require the conflict on an issue to be identified as true, false, or
unprovided for, and require all false conflicts to be resolved Ala Currie.9 We should
add anti-discrimination and the better law to the existing seven choice-influencing
factors, and make those nine factors exclusive. Finally, the third restatement should
prohibit the weighing of "Currie interests" in true conflicts.
No! RIGID RULES

All of the SecondRestatement's rigid rules must go,'0 including the sacrosanct situs
rule for real property issues" and the rule to apply forum law to all procedural

7. These factors or choice-influencing considerations were first identified in Elliott E.
Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice ofthe Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 981
(1952), as the factors that courts actually used to resolve choice-of-law problems regardless
of the approach they purported to follow.
8. See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law--Rules vs. Analysis: A More Workable Marriage
Than the Second Restatement; A Very Well-CurriedLeflar over Reese Approach, 40 MERCER
L. REV. 869, 886 (1989).
9. Apply the law of the state with the only "Currie interest." Bruce Posnak, Choice of
Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1121, 1122 n.4 (1994).
This, in effect, eliminates section 90 of the SecondRestatement. This section provides that the
forum need not apply a foreign law, even though the foreign state has the most significant
relationship with the particular issue if the foreign law violates the forum's public policy. See
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 90. It is about time that this hoariest and most
malleable of all the escape devices bites the dust. See infratext accompanying notes 50-66.
10. Although the Second Restatementprimarily contains rules that merely raise rebuttable
presumptions of the law to apply, there are still some rigid rules carried over from the original
restatement that are supposed to lead ineluctably to the law to apply. See RESTATEMENTOFTHE
LAWOF CONFLICTOF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]; see also Posnak, supra
note 8, at 883 n.80. Dean Symeonides's squishy rigid rules should also be included in this
category. The good Dean would have the court in some situations apply a "rigid" jurisdictionselecting rule unless "exceptional" circumstances exist. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Needfor
a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposalfor Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 447
(2000). In addition to the obvious problem ofidentifying "exceptional circumstances," it seems
to me that this approach merely legitimizes a giant escape device that destroys the purposes of
having a rule.
11. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARYONTHE CONFLICTOF LAWS §§ 8-22, at460
(3d ed. 1986); see also William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenonto an
EmpiricalRestatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 425 (2000); Russell J. Weintraub, At
Least Do No Harm: Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic
Standard?,56 MD. L. REv. 1284, 1307 (1997) [hereinafter Weintraub, Do No Harm].
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issues.' 2 Rigid rules are the antithesis of a functional, 3 flexible approach; they cannot
coexist. If the major goals are rational,' 4 desirable results in individual cases, then we
cannot have rigid rules. Rigid rules sacrifice such results in an attempt to achieve
certainty, predictability, ease of administration, and uniformity of result.' 5
Eliminating rigid rules and the characterization that goes with them in the Second
Restatement 6 will also avoid placing judges in no-win situations. Judges can
characterize sincerely, but arrive at a result that does not make sense, or they can
"fudge" to reach a desirable result.' Finally, eliminating all rigid rules would resolve
some ambiguities in the Second Restatement. Because the Second Restatement
contains both rigid and presumption-raising rules, and because its language is often
ambiguous, it is not always clear whether a particular rule is one or the other.' 8
Furthermore, the presence of some rigid rules raises the fear and reality that some
judges will treat an intended presumptive rule as if it were rigid.' 9
CONTACTS AND CHARACTERIZATION ELIMINATED

After eliminating all the rigid rules, the contact identification step exemplified by
sections 145 and 188 of the Second Restatement, should be eliminated. The only
office this step seems to serve is to limit the universe of states whose law may apply.
It seems to this author that it is more trouble than it is worth. There is also the
possibility that judges, especially those steeped in the FirstRestatement,will resolve
the conflict by merely toting up these contacts without performing a section 6
analysis.

12. See Weintraub, Do No Harm, supra note 11, at 1300. Forum law, however, should
apply to issues that are not even arguably substantive.
13. A functional approach is one that takes the content of the competing laws into account
as well as other choice-influencing factors. It should be contrasted with a formalistic approach
like the FirstRestatement that ignores these factors.
14. Rational in terms of the content of the competing laws and the facts of the case. See
Bruce Posnak, Choice ofLaw: InterestAnalysisandIts "New Crits",36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 681,
686-88 (1988).
15. See id.; see also William L. Reynolds, Legal Processand Choice of Law, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1371, 1390-93, 1397, 1398-1400 (1997). As Professor Peterson said, "[T]he fact and law
permutations of conflicts cases are so numerous and variable that they defy intelligent
forecasting of the problems which rigid rules may encounter." Courtland H. Peterson, Private
InternationalLaw at the End ofthe Twentieth Century: ProgressorRegress, 46 AM. J.CoMP.
L. 197, 213 (1998).
16. See infratext accompanying notes 19-28.
17. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 889.
18. See id.at 890.
19. See Weintraub, Do No Harm, supra note 11, at 1289.
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The characterization step should also be eliminated.2 ° It does not advance the
choice-of-law inquiry to know that an issue smells like a tort rather than a contract. 2'
Not only has the Second Restatement not reduced the characterization problems
associated with the FirstRestatement,2 it has made them worse. There are more, finer
gradations of characterization required,' yet the Second Restatement provided no
better tools for determining the pigeon hole. 4 This dearth is because there is no
25
principled way to determine whether an issue belongs in a particular area of law.
Moreover, there are many issues that are hybrids-they contain elements from two
areas ofthe law. For example, vicarious liability has arguably equal elements of torts
and contracts. Therefore, reasonable people will differ.2 6 In addition, the candle of
characterization is not worth the flame.27 One must go through numerous time
consuming, brain-wrenching, tortuous contortions to characterize and come up with
a problematic rule that merely raises an easily rebutted presumption of the law to
apply. In fact, the rule that was so difficult to determine does nothing more than
allocate the burden of production.2 1 More fundamentally, in the twenty-first century
should who wins a flesh and blood case depend, even in part, upon into which area
of the law an issue happens to fit?
JusTTwo

Although getting rid of rigid rules and the extra baggage of characterization are
important, this author's most dramatic recommendation is to substitute just two
presumption-raising, jurisdiction-selecting rules (which are not tied to any area ofthe

20. Characterization is the determination of what area of law the case or issue "sounds in."
Although arguably the recommended approach also requires a type of characterization-for
example, whether it is a "common domicile" case. See infra text accompanying notes 29-41.
This "characterization" is of a different order than departmentalization into an area of law.
More importantly, this type of "characterization" is not only simpler and more certain, it is
more likely to point toward the correct choice-of-law. See infra text accompanying notes 3741.
21. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 889.
22. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 43-48.
23. See, e.g., Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1191-93 (Ariz. 1985) (in banc); Wood
Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369, 1372 & nn.3-4 (Colo. 1979)

(en banc).
24. Actually, neither Restatement supplies any helpful criteria to guide in the
characterization process; therefore, I cannot cite to any provision in the Second Restatement.
25. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 889.
26. See id.
27. Indeed, the Restatement has a Rube Goldbergish flavor to it. (Those who are too young
to know about Rube, ask your elders.) See Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevision of the
Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475,477 (2000).
28. That is to say that when aSecondRestatementcourt decides which presumption raising
rule to apply it merely places the burden of overcoming this presumption by way of the section
6 factors on the party disfavored by the presumption. As everyone who is familiar with these
factors knows, there is, in the vast majority of cases, at least a colorable argument that the
factors point away from the presumption, thus arguably shifting the burden back to the party
who was favored by the characterization step.
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law so that they do not require that type of characterization) for the hundreds of rules
in the Second Restatement.29 Not only would this greatly simplify the task, these two
rules are at least as likely to point to the desirable law in terms of the traditionally
recognized choice-influencing factors30 as the hundreds of rules they would replace.
In fact the hundreds of rules would usually lead to the same presumption as the two
I suggest, albeit with a great deal more ado. Before getting to these two rules,31 one
should note that if the party wishing to displace forum law cannot persuade the court
that either rule is applicable, the forum law would apply to that issue. The first rule
is that if both parties32 are from the same state,33 its laws presumptively apply to all
issues in the case.34 The only other rule is that if the parties are not from the same
state but a significant portion of the probative facts35 took place in the home state of
only one of the parties, its laws should presumptively apply to all the issues. 6
Both of the suggested rules, like Cavers's principles of preference, are based on
experience.3 7 The vast majority of "common domicile" cases will not only turn out
to be false conflicts with the common state having the only Currie-interest, 38 that state
will almost always be the one to which, in the aggregate, the other choice-influencing
factors point.39 Although the issues covered by the "split domicile" rule will not
usually be false conflicts,4" the presumptive rule will more often than not, and more

29. I now proffer my third head for chopping off. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 875 n.36.
Although I have consistently maintained that the initial presumption be that forum law should
apply, see Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well-CurriedLeflarApproach, 34 MERCER
L. REV. 731 (1983), I originally suggested that there should be nojurisdiction-selecting rules,
and that the party disfavored by the initial presumption carry the burden of showing that the
choice-influencing factors point away from forum law. See id.at 777-83. Then I suggested the
use of thejurisdiction-selecting rules of the Second Restatementto raise the presumptions that
could overcome the forum law presumption. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 875. But now I have
chopped off that head too by suggesting that there be only two rules.
30. See generally Cheatham & Reese, supra note 7 (describing the traditional choiceinfluencing factors).
31. I must confess that the inspiration for the content of these two rules came from
Professor Kom despite the fact that we are poles apart. See Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: A Critique,83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 800-01 (1983); see also Posnak, supra note

14, at 691-727 (supporting proposition that the author and Professor Kom are miles apart).
32. Or in a multiparty case, if the majority of plaintiffs and the majority of defendants are
from the same state.
33. 1will leave the delineation of this to future scholars.
34. I would make an exception for those issues that are not even arguably substantive,
realizing that this will breed litigation.
35. I will also leave defining the contours of this phrase to future scholars.
36. An analogous rule would apply to multiparty cases. See supra note 32.
37. See DAVID F. CAvERS, THE CHOICEOF LAW PROCESS 121-22, 139-59, 181-94 (1965).
38. See Posnak, supra note 14, at 702-08.
39. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Hammschild v. Continental
Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 818-20 (Wis. 1959).
40. They will usually be either true conflicts-if each party's state's law favored her---or
unprovided for-if the converse were true.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:561

often than just applying forum
law, point to the more desirable law in terms of the
41
choice-influencing factors.
Many commentators, including the author, 42 have argued that there should not be
any presumption-raising or rigid jurisdiction-selecting rules.43 Some of these
commentators maintain that the court should presume that forum law applies and that
the party disfavored by forum law must show that the other state has the only
interest.4 Other commentators argue that the party disfavored by the presumption of
forum law should go immediately to the choice-influencing factors like those in
section 6 and carry the burden of demonstrating that these factors point away from
forum law on the issue.45 This author, however, suggests that the party disfavored by
forum law be given the opportunity to show that one of the two recommended
jurisdiction-selecting rules is satisfied in order to reallocate the burden of proof. In
order to encourage judges not to treat these rules as dispositive, the fact that they
merely affect the burden of production should be emphasized.
Because there are only two rules, and because they are relatively straightforward,
this step should not be onerous or very time consuming46 and is recommended over
going immediately to the factors. More importantly, if a party can show that either
of the rules applies and is contrary to the forum's law, then the burden of production
shouldshift to the opposing party. In such cases, applying the law called for by either
of the rules, instead of just applying forum law, is more likely to lead to results
rational in terms of the competing laws and the facts of the case, and results more
consistent with the choice-influencing factors.47
CONFLICTSIDENTIFIED

As described above, the SecondRestatement contains too much, 4' but in some ways
it does not contain enough. Although some courts that apply the Second Restatement
put each issue through a Currie-type interest analysis and determine whether the issue
is false, true or unprovided for,49 the Second Restatement does not require this. ° If a

41. But cf Kom, supra note 31, at 801, 967.

42. See Posnak, supranote 29, at 777-83.
43. See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, MarriedWomen's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Law
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 119-27 (1963) [hereinafter
CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts];BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, supra, at 185
[hereinafter CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives]; Moffatt Hancock, Torts Problems in
Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Halley and Other Older Cases
Revisited, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331, 350 (1968); Weinberg, supra note 27, at 478-79.
44. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 29.
45. See, e.g., Weinberg, supranote 27, at 507-08.

46. That is not to say, however, that reasonable people sometimes might disagree about
whether there is a"common domicile" or whether the requirements of the recommended "split
domicile" rule are satisfied.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 29-41.
48. The Restatement should not include characterization or the hundreds of rules. See supra
text accompanying notes 19-36.
49. See, e.g., Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1192-97 (Ariz. 1985) (in banc); Wood
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court leaves out this step, it does not get the full picture it needs to make an informed
decision of the law to apply. No matter which law a court chooses (even if it chooses
not to apply the law of the only interested state in a false conflict), it should realize
what it is doing in terms of the Currie-interests. 5 Presumably, if a court decided to
apply the law of a state, realizing that the other state had the only Currie-interest, it
factors than if it had
would require more in terms of the other choice-influencing
52
concluded that both or neither state had a Currie-interest.
FALSE CONFLICTS: THE ONLY RPGID RULE
Not only does the Second Restatement not require the conflict to be identified, it
positively encourages courts to apply the wrong 3 law in false conflicts.54 Although
reasonable people differ, 5 the Second Restatementshould require that when an issue
is identified as a false conflict, the law of the only interested state should be applied.
This would lead to results rational in terms of the policies of the competing laws and
the facts of the case. 6 It would also simplify the judicial task and enhance certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result. If a court identifies a conflict as false, that is
"all she wrote." Under the Second Restatement, even false conflicts are to undergo
analysis by way of the section 6 choice-influencing factors, and this analysis could
result in applying the law of the "interestless" state."
If the conflict is not identified as false, the section 6 factors plus two new ones"8
should apply, and should be made exclusive. The current Restatement's laundry list
is not meant to be exclusive.59 Although this author can see the argument in favor of
an open-ended list,' enough is enough.6

Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369, 1372-74 (Colo. 1979) (en
banc).
50. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. b.
51. See supra note 9.
52. See Posnak, supranote 8, at 876. Once again I have changed my mind. I had advocated
that identifying the conflict in Currie parlance precedes the step of determining whether a
presumption-raising rule applies. See id. at 877. But now that Ihave replaced the hundreds of
jurisdiction-selecting rules with just two, I think it would be more efficient to first determine
whether one ofthe twojurisdiction-selecting rules apply. Moreover, ifthe court concluded that
one of the two rules applied, the party disfavored by the presumption may take his ball and go
home so that it would never be necessary to identify the type of conflict, which I believe
usually would be more time consuming and problematic than determining if one of the two
rules applied.
53. See id. at 877-81; see also Posnak, supra note 14, at 683, 686-89.
54. See supra text accompanying note 52.
55. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 877-81.
56. See id.
57. See supra text accompanying note 47.
58. See infratext accompanying notes 67-89.
59. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 890 n. I11.
60. See Alfred Hill, The Judicial Functionin Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1585,
1587 (1985).
61. See Posnak, supranote 8, at 893.
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True conflicts should be resolved by using choice-influencing factors, but the
weighing or comparing of the Currie-interests should be prohibited.62 This author's
reasons for this prohibition are the same Currie gave over forty years ago.63 This
would relieve courts of the impossible burden of somehow quantifying the Currieinterests of the two states and then somehow determining which is paramount or
superior.' Furthermore, if the Currie-interests were not quantified, the courts would
not have to weigh the fact that one state had the stronger Currie-interest against the
fact that, in the aggregate, the other choice-influencing factors point to the other
state's law.6" This would eliminate having to compare the proverbial apples and
oranges. Since the weight of the Currie-interests would be a nonfactor, the true
conflict would have to be resolved by the remaining section 6 choice-influencing
factors.6
Two "NEW " 67 CHOICE-INFLUENCINGFACTORS

In addition to these changes in the existing section 6 factors, two "new" choiceinfluencing factors should be added to resolve true conflicts and unprovided for
issues: conflicts justice, that is, the avoidance of unnecessarydiscrimination, and the
"better law." 6 Discrimination occurs if a court applies different laws to similarly
situated people. 69 It is unnecessaryif applying the same law to these people would not
be irrational in terms of the policies of the competing laws and the facts of the case.
It would only be irrational if it were a false conflict and a state other than the state
whose law had been previously applied to someone similarly situated possessed the
only Curtie-interest. ° The last sentence cries out for a concrete example and Tooker
supplies it. Three Michigan coeds were in a fatal one-car accident on a trip that was
to begin and end there."' One of the passengers was from Michigan, but the driver and
the other passenger were from New York where the car was insured and registered

62. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6(2)(c); see also Posnak, supra note 8, at
892 n.122.
63. See CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives, supranote 43, at 182. I would, like
Currie, reexamine the tentative interests with restraint and moderation to determine whether
the states really have Currie-interests. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 892 n.124.
64. One problem with weighing Currie-interests is that what is to be quantified is not even
clear-is it the quality of a competing law, the importance to the state of having its law
applied, or something else?
65. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 892-93.
66. This would eliminate the second phrase in the Second Restatement's section 6(2)(c).
67. They have been around for a long time. I did not invent them. See supranote 7. Indeed
Professor Weinberg would add the same two factors. See Weinberg, supra note 27, at 507.
Even though her conception of better law and antidiscrimination differ somewhat from mine,
the fact that two great minds independently reached similar conclusions should count for
something, but I am not sure what.
68. See generally Posnak, supra note 8, at 886 n.95, 893-97.
69. See Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411 (N.Y. 1969) (Brietel, J., dissenting).
70. Consequently, avoiding discrimination should be a potential choice-influencing factor
in true conflicts and unprovided-for issues because applying either of the competing laws in
the former, or any law in the latter, cannot be irrational in the Currie scheme of things.
71. See Tooker, 249 N.E.2d at 395.
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in the name of the driver's New York father.7' Michigan, but not New York, had a
guest statute.7' The New York passenger's estate sued in New York, and the court
applied the plaintiff-favoring New York law, which did not require a showing of
gross negligence.74 If Ms. Silk, the Michigan passenger, sues, the forum (wherever
it is), in deciding which law to apply, should take into account the fact that someone
(the New York passenger), similarly situated to this Michigan plaintiff, received the
benefit ofthe pro-plaintiff New York law. The court should consider this because this
second case brought by Ms. Silk is not a false conflict with Michigan possessing the
only interest. Michigan's guest statute was probably passed to hold down insurance
premiums, but recovery in this case (involving a single car owned by a New Yorker,
registered and insured there) will not affect premiums in Michigan.75 No purpose or
policy of the Michigan guest statute would be furthered if applied, nor frustrated if
the New York law was applied. The Michigan guest statute was not promulgated to
preclude apassengerfrom recoveringjustbecause thatpassengerwas from Michigan.
Similarly, applying the New York law (requiring only a showing of simple
negligence) would not further or thwart any of its policies. 76 This, then, is an
unprovided-for issue-no policy behind either state's competing law is implicated.'
Not only should avoiding discrimination be one of the relevant factors in deciding
which law to apply to Ms. Silk's claim, it should be dispositive because none of the
other section 6 factors seem to point to the Michigan law that requires gross
negligence.7 8 Consequently, there is no legitimate reason for denying the benefit of
the pro-plaintiff New York law to Ms. Silk, but there is a good reason for applying79
it: another similarly situated (the other passenger) has had it applied in her favor.
Indeed, ifNew York is the forum in both cases, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Constitution should require the application of the New York law for Ms. Silk's
benefit.8"

72. See id.
73. See ide
74. See id.
75. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of Legal
Reasoning, 65 TEX. L. REV. 215, 228-29 (1986) (book review).
76. In this context where the New York simple negligence law is competing against the
Michigan gross negligence law, one can say that the policy of the New York law was to
compensate. But since a Michigan plaintiff is involved, one cannot say that the policy would
be furthered. See CURRIE, MarriedWomen's Contracts,supra note 43, at 85-87.
77. Despite what Professor Kramer claims. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the
'Unprovided-for' Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
78. The fact that the accident occurred in Michigan and most people, if asked, would
expect Michigan law to apply is not the type of expectation that deserves any weight because
no one relied on it. It certainly should not trump the aspiration to treat similarly situated people
the same. But see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992); Aaron D.
Twesrski, EnglightenedTerritorialismand ProfessorCavers-The PennsylvaniaMethod, 9
DUQ. L. REv. 373, 378 (1971).
79. See Posnak, supranote 14, at 723-26.
80. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 886-87 n.95. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE,
UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF

LAWs, supra note 43, at 490-511; Mark P. Gergen,
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BETTER LAW

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, this author recommends that the Second
Restatement explicitly include the "better law" as one of its choice-influencing factors
in section 6. Although many commentators, including the Restatement's reporter,8
adamantly contend that the Second Restatement does not and should not contain a
"better law" component, 2 this consideration may "sneak" in the side door.83 The
Second Restatementcalls upon the courtto apply the law that will carry out "the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law."'" This will usually point to the better
law. For example, two basic policies underlying the law of negligence are
compensation and spreading the risk. The competing law that is consistent with those
policies will often be considered "better." For example, a law that does not artificially
limit compensatory damages should be considered better than one that does because
it spreads the risks and makes the injured party whole. This coincidence ofthe "better
law" with the basic policies underlying an area of the law is not a coincidence. The
competing law that does more to carry out the basic policies underlying a particular
field of law is tantamount to the better law. The reason that one law is better is
because it more effectively carries out the current basic policies underlying its field
of law.
Since the Restatement implicitly contains a "better law" factor, and since most
people realize that it could never be kept out no matter what the Restatement or any
law said,8" drafters should avoid hypocrisy and explicitly include it. More positively
and persuasively, the "better law" factor should be included even ifjudges could be
convinced to ignore it. It should, however, be assigned a limited and defined role.
Contrary to what many commentators believe,86 even if the "better law" is included
as a section 6 factor, it need not always, or even usually, affect the choice-of-law
decision. The better law factor should be articulated so that the personal opinions of
the judge as to the relative quality of the competing laws, the fact that one of the laws
belongs to the forum, or the fact that applying one will benefit a forum resident,
should all be irrelevant.87 Moreover, to avoid misleading and confusion, the "better

Equality andthe Conflict ofLaws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1988); Posnak, supra note 9, at 1124

n.17, 1155-59 & nn.198-209.
81. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Second), 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963).
82. See, e.g., CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts,supra note 43, at 104-06; Arthur
Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice ofLaw Methodology,60 CORNELL L. REV. 927,
952 (1975).

83. There is no doubt that the "better law" factor will often slide under the back door. See
Posnak, supra note 8, at 893 n.130.
84. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6(2)(e).
85. See Posnak, supranote 8, at 894 n.135.
86. See, e.g., Henna Hill Kay, Testing the Modern Critics Against Moffatt Hancock's
Choice ofLaw Theories, 73 CAL. L. REV. 525, 533 (1985).

87. Some commentators do not believe judges are capable of disregarding these factors.
See, e.g., Kom, supra note 31, at 781. 1 disagree even though I believe that if no latitude is
given judges to consider the quality of the competing laws, they will often take their personal
predilections into account. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 895 n. 140.
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law" choice-influencing factor should be renamed the "stinky law" choiceinfluencing factor. When deciding whether one of the competing laws is "better,"88
[Thejudge] will consider whether [either one of] the rule[s] is anachronistic in its
origins, whether commentators tend to favor or oppose it in its modem context
and whether courts in any of the states where it is in force have given it a
restricted construction....
...The better lav analysis does not.., purport to give the judge the same
breadth of choice [in a conflicts case of choosing between competing laws when
the law of the jurisdiction isn't clear] that he enjoys in the context of domestic

adjudication.... [In order to find one law "stinky" which is a prerequisiteto

finding one "better"] an objective demonstration must be made that the rule in
question is an anachronism, repugnant to accepted present-day policies, by
reference to judicial or commentarial criticisms or through historical policy
analysis. 9
Rarely will either competing law satisfy this criteria, and the criteria places significant
constraints on trial judges." Another significant limitation on the "better law" is the
fact that this author recommends that the court should not even consider whether
there is a "better law" unless it identifies the conflict as true or unprovided for, and
even then, only if consideration of the other section 6 factors is inconclusive. 9
Finally, this author will discuss another constraint that Professor Weinberg would
place upon a court choosing foreign law because it is better. She would encourage the
forum not to conclude that foreign law is better and apply it in a conflicts case unless
it is prepared to adopt it for future domestic cases as well.92 Although I think I agree
with her conclusion and her reasons, Iam uncomfortable about those situations where
the displaced forum law was the creature of the forum's legislature or where the
forum's displaced common lav had received the stamp of approval ofthe legislature.
In such cases we have separation of powers problems.
CONCLUSION
There should be a "Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws." It should retain what
is good and at the core of the Second Restatement-usingjurisdiction-selecting rules
(but only two instead of hundreds) to allocate the burden of production and raise

88. It would be clearer to phrase this initial inquiry as follows: "Is one of the laws a drag
on the coattails of society?" If the inquiry were so phrased, one should see that only rarely
would this factor point to either competing law. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow
that a law is "better" just because it represents the majority position or the trend.
89. MOFFATT HANCOCK, STUDESIN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAw:ToRTs, INSURANCE, LAND
TITLES 98, 141 (1984).
90. Indeed, with the "better law" factor out in the open, along with the objective criteria
for it, there would me more constraints upon a judge selecting one law merely because she
liked it, it was the forum's, or it benefitted the "homey."
91. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 896.
92. See Weinberg, supranote 43, at 501-03. Professor Currie and I have flirted with this
requirement. See Posnak, supra note 8, at 877 &n.52; see also Posnak, supra note 29, at 778
n.243.
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presumptions that a functional analysis may rebut. The contact identifying and
characterization steps, as well as all rigid rules, should be excised. The conflict should
be identified in Currie-parlance as false, true, or unprovided for. If false, the law of
the only "interested" state should apply. If true, the "Currie interests" should not be
weighed. The section 6 factors should be made exclusive, and "better law" and
conflicts justice (avoiding discrimination) should be added to them.
Professor von Mehren, commenting on the Second Restatement, said:
The approach is ample enough to encompass a highly developed policy-based
analysis. However, the Restatement does not significantly refine and discipline
theory and analysis. No principled basis is adumbrated, for example, in terms of
which clashes between policies underlying specific domestic-law rules [Currie
policies] and more general policies of comprehensibility or of facilitation of
multistate activity can be resolved.93
The recommended approach fares better in satisfying the implicit and explicit
criteria of Professor von Mehren than the Second Restatement. Implicit in the quote
is the admonition that any choice-of-law approach should permit consideration of the
forum's policies, both those emanating from its competing law and those emanating
from other sources. The rigid jurisdiction-selecting rules of the Second Restatement
ignore the content of the competing laws and could not pass muster. One cannot
adequately considerthe forum's policies unless one considers the content andpolicies
ofthe forum's competing law. In fact there can be no "analysis" ifrigid choice-of-law
rules are applied. Since the recommendation calls for consideration of the policies of
the forum's competing law, and, when the conflict is identified as other than false,
other forum policies, it satisfies this criterion. Although the presumption-raising rules
of the Second Restatement also satisfy this criterion, the recommended approach
"refine(s) and discipline(s) theory and analysis" to a significantly greater extent than
the SecondRestatement.The recommended approach, unlike the SecondRestatement,
provides not only a principled basis for resolving at least some clashes between
"policies underlying specific domestic-law rules and more general policies of
comprehensibility," it also provides a more certain one: if only one state has a Currie
interest, its law applies to that issue regardless of the other "more general policies"
of section 6. Moreover, it "refine(s) and discipline(s) theory and analysis" by
prohibiting the weighing of the Currie-interests in a true conflict.
Referring to the Second Restatement, a leading casebook asks: "The critical
question is whether the series of compromises that produced the Restatement, and the
attempted fusion ofjurisdiction-selecting rules with open-ended policy analysis, has
resulted in a flabby, amorphous and sterile product."94 The recommended third
restatement ameliorates at least some of the significant defects in the Second
Restatement, and this will lead to a lean, mean machine or at least a trimmed down,
clearer, and dynamic product.9" It is, however, far from perfect. It incorporates
interest analysis, and, as many have pointed out frequently, reasonable people will
differ as to whether a state has an interest and therefore as to the law to apply. It also

93. von Mehren, supranote 82, at 964.

94.

ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 318 (3d ed. 1981).

95. See Posnak, supranote 8, at 909.
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requires the application of the law of the only state with an interest in a false conflict,
and many reasonable people disagree with that.96 Nevertheless, since courts must
choose a law when the choice-of-law issue is raised and since the recommended
approach is the best alternative because it addresses more of the right questions, it
should be adopted, warts and all, "until someone comes along with a better idea."97

96. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, ConflictsLaw: More on Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,
54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1585-98 (1966).
97. Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1243
(1963); see also Posnak, supranote 8, at 911.

